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Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine 
Failures 
0. Abstract 
David Christensen and others argue that Dutch Strategies are more like peer disagreements 
than Dutch Books, and should not count against agents’ conformity to ideal rationality. I 
review these arguments, then show that Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and peer 
disagreements are only possible in the case of what computer scientists call Byzantine 
Failures—uncorrected Byzantine Faults which update arbitrary values. Yet such Byzantine 
Failures make agents equally vulnerable to all three kinds of epistemic inconsistencies, so 
there is no principled basis for claiming that only avoidance of true Dutch Books 
characterizes ideally rational agents. Agents without Byzantine Failures can be ideally 
rational in a very strong sense, but are not normative for humans. Bounded rationality in the 
presence of Byzantine Faults remains an unsolved problem. 
1. Consistency Paradoxes for Ideal Rational Agents 
1.1 Paradoxes of Rational Requirements 
 The following characteristics are often taken to characterize an ideally rational agent 
(Grüne‐Yanoff, 2007): 
1.1.1 the agent’s preference ordering over her prospects1 is complete 
1.1.2 the agent’s preference ordering over her prospects is transitive 
1.1.3 the agent’s preference ordering over her prospects is continuous 
                                                 
1 The set of prospects at any time is fixed, and each prospect is either a future state of the 
world which occurs with certainty or a probability distribution over such states. 
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1.1.4 the agent’s preference ordering over her prospects is independent of irrelevant 
alternatives 
1.2.1 the agent’s set of probabilistic beliefs is coherent (they satisfy the Kolmogorov 
axioms) 
1.2.2 the agent’s set of probabilistic beliefs is complete 
1.2.3 the agent updates her probabilistic beliefs by conditionalization 
Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti discovered a natural way of unifying these perhaps 
seemingly disparate characteristics through the phenomenon of Dutch Books. In a Dutch 
Book, a bettor faces a guaranteed loss (regardless of the outcome of any risks hazarded), 
when making a series of synchronic bets at her fair betting quotient2 against a competent 
bookie who possesses no evidence not also in the possession of the bettor (Vineberg, 2016). 
Characteristics 1.1.1-1.1.4 are the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Expected 
Utility Theory (1953), which gives the standard method for assigning value under conditions 
of risk, and hence for interpreting the notion of a guaranteed loss. Characteristic 1.2.2 ensures 
that the better actually has a fair betting quotient for all of the bets offered by the bookie. 
Ramsey (1964) and de Finetti (1964) then show that unless the bettor possesses characteristic 
1.2.1, she can face a Dutch Book. While the pragmatic connections among guaranteed losses, 
optimal bets, and ideal rationality are perhaps tenuous and difficult to define, the possibility 
of a Dutch Book is nonetheless a plausible illustration of a failure of ideal rationality 
(Skyrms, 1987). When the series of bets is offered diachronically, a guaranteed-loss situation 
is called a Dutch Strategy,3 which Teller (1973) and Armendt (1980) show results for any 
agent lacking characteristic 1.2.3. Since Dutch Books and Strategies connect the Expected 
                                                 
2 A fair betting quotient is the odds at which the bettor is equally willing to take either side of 
the bet. 
3 Skyrms (1993) gives the exact conditions for such a diachronic series. 
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Utility Theory axioms, the Kolmogorov axioms for probability theory, and Bayesian 
reasoning—each of which has been enormously fruitful—they seem to have explanatory 
power for characterizing ideally rational agents. The characteristics they demand can be 
summed up as “epistemic consistency” (Christensen, 1991). 
 Bas van Fraassen (1984) and Jordan Sobel (1987) show that avoiding Dutch 
Strategies also justifies another proposed characteristic of ideally rational agents: Reflection.  
The principle of Reflection demands strong diachronic consistency in judgments, such that 
“the agent's present subjective probability for proposition A, on the supposition that his 
subjective probability for this proposition will equal r at some later time, must equal this 
same number r” (van Fraassen, 1984).4 David Christensen (1991) worries that Reflection 
leads to paradoxes—most seriously a contradictions with the Kolmogorov axioms in a 
situation where an agent has a small-but-non-zero credence that she will in the future have 
credence .95 that she has no credences greater than .90.5 Reflection means that an agent who 
will be irrational in the future must be irrational today, a result Christensen takes as absurd. 
W.J. Talbott (1991) improves on Christensen’s argument in two regards. First, he shows that 
the general formula for generating Christensen cases is any situation in which an agent 
expects that she will violate Conditionalization (characteristic 1.2.3). Second, he gives an 
                                                 
4 In other words, a change in credence requires a change in evidence. Credences of ideally 
rational agents, like stock prices in efficient markets, must “already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, 
the market expects to take place in the future…the full effects of new information on intrinsic 
values [will] be reflected ‘instantaneously’ in actual prices…[so]…successive price changes 
in individual securities will be independent...[and]…the future path of the price level of a 
security is no more predictable than the path of a series of cumulated random numbers” 
(Fama, 1965). In fact, because prediction market prices can be interpreted as credences 
(Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2006), the theory of efficient markets (where traders get no free lunch) 
and ideally rational agents (where bookies get no free lunch) have the same constraints. 
5 Perhaps because a typically reliable informant has informed her that her drink was spiked 




everyday example in which an agent expects that she will violate Conditionalization without 
doing anything obviously irrational: all the agent has to do is (1) have credence r about the 
contents of her breakfast on day T (today) and (2) expect that on day T+365 she will have a 
credence less than r about the contents of her breakfast on day T. We are clearly all 
ineluctably vulnerable to Dutch Strategies.  
1.2 Equivalence of Single-Agent Diachronic Consistency and Two-Agent Synchronic 
Consistency 
 Christensen (1991) shows that single-agent Dutch Strategies are equivalent to Double 
Agent Dutch Books. In a Double Agent Dutch Book, a bookie makes a sure profit on a set of 
synchronic bets with a pair of bettors whose credences differ. We can easily convert any 
Dutch Strategy into a Double Agent Dutch Book by simply replacing the future agent in the 
description with a parallel agent. If the parallel agents’ prospects are entangled (e.g. by joint 
finances), then the bookie’s sure gain implies a sure loss for both of them. In a further 
(unnamed) variation, which Christensen discusses as an inconsistency without actually giving 
a Dutch Book, the agents’ credences need not actually differ as long as one agent believes 
that they differ. If I am willing to bet 3:1 odds-on that Reflection is a true characterization of 
all rational agents and also willing to bet 3:1 odds-on that Christensen will bet odds-against 
this claim, then the bookie makes a sure profit no matter whether Christensen (having come 
around) prefers 3:1 odds-on for Reflection or (still holding out) 3:1 odds-against Reflection. 
The bookie’s payoffs are given in Table 1 (when she varies her stakes as indicated there).  
Table 1 
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The bookie has developed a Double Agent Dutch Book just by knowing that I think I 
disagree with Christensen. In a way this is unsurprising: Dutch Books are tests of epistemic 
consistency, and peer disagreement seems like it can be characterized as group inconsistency. 
Christensen, however, stresses that such group inconsistency is not indicative of any failure 
of ideal rationality in the agents who make up the group—perhaps, for instance, the agents 
have reasonably differing priors. 
1.3 Limitations on Expectations of Consistency in Ideal Rational Agents 
 Christensen (1991) argues that since Dutch Strategies lead to paradoxes and their 
structurally-identical Double Agent Dutch Books do not indicate failures of ideal rationality, 
Dutch Strategies themselves should not be interpreted as constraints on ideally rational 
agents. This nonetheless comes at a cost for Christensen, since such Dutch Strategies are the 
leading support for Conditionalization (characteristic 1.2.3) which Christensen accepts. Since 
Talbott (1991)’s examples show that humans cannot always expect to obey 
Conditionalization (yet he thinks we ought to be rational and ought-implies-can), he jettisons 
that principle along with Reflection and Dutch Strategy avoidance in general. Talbott takes it 
that only Dutch Books and Strategies where the agent is aware of the guaranteed loss 
constrain rationality, but this renders them fruitless as tests of general epistemic consistency. 
Surely rationality requires more than avoiding explicit guaranteed losses. 
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 Christensen himself later brings pressure from two directions against this approach of 
relaxing constraints on ideal rationality. First, he treats peer disagreement as a source of 
epistemic concern for rational agents (Christensen, 2000, 2007b). Second, in the presence of 
irrational beliefs even purely Synchronic Reflection also leads to paradoxes, even though it is 
supported by a simple single agent Dutch Book (Christensen, 2007a). Christensen releases 
this pressure by weakening the constraints yet further: we shouldn’t expect perfect synchronic 
meta-consistency, either (2007a). The arguments for it aren’t a true Dutch Book, Christensen 
says, because the bookie has contingent knowledge that the agent doesn’t have—it just 
happens to be knowledge about the agent’s own credences (Christensen, 2007a). 
Credences—whether synchronic or diachronic, first-party or third-party—are just ordinary 
evidence (Christensen, 2007a). Sherrilyn Roush (2009) uses the idea that credences are just 
ordinary evidence to develop a Re-Cal variant of Conditionalization for rational updating of 
credences even in the face of first-order Conditionalization failures. Because this method 
relies on principled distinctions between first-, second-, and higher-order evidence, 
credences, and Conditionalization, it is of no assistance for resolving cases where the non-
rational first-order credences are not governed by higher-order credences and thus subject to 
revision. Peer disagreement is just a special case of this latter situation: neither of the peers’ 
credences are higher-order with respect to the other, so there is no rational way to resolve the 
incoherence (Roush, 2009).  
 These arguments naturally lead to a three-fold categorization of epistemic consistency 
demands: strict constraints on rationality supported by true Dutch Books, broader principles 
supported by Dutch Strategies that should be used when reality doesn’t conspire against us 
(Vineberg, 1997), and cases of pure inconsistency lacking any principled method for 
resolution. Ideally rational agents should be untroubled by peer disagreement, avoid Dutch 
Strategies whenever they can do so without paradox, and avoid Dutch Books at all costs. 
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Only vulnerability to true Dutch Books should worry us concerning an agent’s 
characterization as ideally rational. 
2. The Byzantine Failure Explanation of Consistency Paradoxes 
2.1 Byzantine Generals and Byzantine Failures in Computer Science 
 The large philosophical literature generating and analyzing the paradoxes that result 
when supposedly ideal rational agents are confronted with nonrational beliefs can be 
understood as instances of what computer scientists call the Byzantine Generals problem. The 
thought experiment given by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease (1982) runs as follows. A number 
of generals from Byzantium are encamped around a city they have under siege, each with his 
own army. They are trying to decide whether to storm the city or retreat until the next 
campaign season, but face the difficulty that some of their number may be traitorous. The 
constraints on their decision-making are that all loyal generals must adopt the same plan (lest 
their forces be scattered and routed) and that plan must be the one that a majority of loyal 
generals privately think best (lest the traitors control the army’s strategic decision-making to 
their advantage).6 Under what conditions can these constraints be met? Given Kenneth May 
(1952)’s theorem in favor of simple-majority voting for two-candidate ballots, a first instinct 
is to assume that the constraints are met as long as the super-majority among loyal generals is 
greater than the number of traitors. The trouble is that in the Byzantine scenario there is no 
neutral arbiter to count the ballots, and a traitorous general may send different responses to 
different loyal generals in order to sow disarray.  
                                                 
6 One may note a certain analogy to Kenneth Arrow (1950)’s impossibility theorem for 
converting individual ordinal preferences to community ordinal preferences under conditions 
of unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. Decision theory has already been analyzed in these terms by Rachael Briggs 
(2010). In the Byzantine Generals case, the domain has been restricted, but the non-
dictatorship requirement has been strengthened. 
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 Lamport et al. (1982) derive three important results from the Byzantine Generals 
problem. The first is that it is equivalent to the Byzantine Lieutenants problem, wherein all 
loyal Lieutenant Generals adopt the same plan, and it is the plan ordered by the Field Marshal 
as long as the Field Marshal is loyal. Hierarchy in place of anonymity provides no assistance 
if the hierarchy cannot be trusted. The second result is that the problem cannot be solved 
without 3t + 1 generals, where t is the number of traitors. The third result is that if traitors can 
be caught when forging messages (e.g. by enforcing cryptographic signing), then the naïve 
supermajority solution holds, because each general can report every message he receives to 
every other general without possibility of deception. 
 While the canonical form of the Byzantine Generals problem involves malicious 
actors, Lamport et al. (1982) are clear that it applies just as strongly to ordinary hardware 
failures which result in different signals being received by different processors. In fact their 
earlier more rigorous and less didactic paper (Pease, Shostak, & Lamport, 1980) mentions 
only faulty processors and not traitorous generals. Here the constraint is merely that 
“independent processes” must “arrive at an exact mutual agreement of some kind” (Pease et 
al., 1980). A system which meets this constraint exhibits “interactive consistency” (Pease et 
al., 1980). A faulty processor can play the role of a traitorous general merely by reporting 
different values to different peer processors. When two processors disagree about the value of 
an input, this is merely the Lieutenants version of the problem (Lamport et al., 1982). Further, 
“processor” means nothing more than a peer agent in a parallel system (Lamport et al., 1982) 
or even a subsequent independent state of a single system (Biely & Hutle, 2009). Later papers 
on the Byzantine Generals problem thus often recast it in terms of “Byzantine Faults” which 
“present different symptoms to different observers” and “Byzantine Failures” in which 
systems requiring interactive consistency cannot achieve it due to Byzantine Faults (Driscoll, 
Hall, Paulitsch, Zumsteg, & Sivencrona, 2004). If a Byzantine Fault is detected and 
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corrected, whether by a trusted meta-process or a robust consensus protocol, then it will not 
result in a Byzantine Failure (Arora & Kulkarni, 1998). Since arbitrary hardware failures lead 
to arbitrary processing results, any arbitrary hardware failure can easily lead to a Byzantine 
Fault (Lamport et al., 1982; Driscoll et al., 2004). This leads Arora and Kulkami (1998) to 
simply define Byzantine Faults as those which “corrupt processes permanently7 and 
undetectably8 such that the corrupted processes execute arbitrarily nondeterministic9 actions.” 
Such processes will obviously be inconsistent with the correctly-functioning processes. Biely 
and Hutle (2009) call Byzantine Faults “arbitrary value faults” because the result is that there 
is no constraint on the output value of the process. Byzantine Faults are the most general 
model of faults because they do not assume that any degree of detection and correction is 
possible (Biely & Hutle, 2009). 
2.2 Peer Disagreement Cases as Byzantine Failures 
 Peer disagreement cases are the most obvious instances of Byzantine Failure in 
human agents. In the check-splitting case (Christensen, 2007b), two peers need to come to 
consensus about the total bill so that each pays the correct amount. The peers produce 
inconsistent answers. If each interpreted a smudged line on the bill differently, we have the 
faulty-input Byzantine Lieutenants problem. Since both know how to perform arithmetic, if 
one has added incorrectly then it is due to an arbitrary, non-deterministic fault like skipping a 
line, adding a line twice, failing to carry, etc. The agent did not catch this fault before making 
                                                 
7 I have left out the complicated discussion of timing in the Byzantine Generals literature 
because unlike real carbon or silicon agents, Dutch Strategies operate on a turn-based system. 
Permanent in this context merely means extending beyond the time-out in a real-time system 
or until the end of the turn in a turn-based system. 
8 Undetectable by the system itself, because if a process detects its own fault, then it will not 
report it, whereas if a neutral arbiter does so, then that process is no longer a peer. This does 
not mean that the fault is undetectable in principle by an arbiter outside the system. 
9 Arbitrary and nondeterministic not in the strong sense of appealing to irreducible objective 




her report. There is no detector available (e.g. a trusted third party, or a checksum algorithm). 
It does not matter whether the error leads to forged responses or not,10 because there are not 
enough agents available to perform even the naïve majoritarian consensus protocol. The 
Byzantine Fault has led to a Byzantine Failure where there is no correct procedure for 
achieving consensus—the system lacks interactive consistency. 
 Analysis of the check-splitting case in more traditional terms yields the same result. If 
both agents stand fast then there is a Double Agent Dutch Book against them—they are 
epistemically inconsistent. The parties can take each other’s credences as evidence and use 
Conditionalization to update their own credences, but doing so won’t generally result in 
convergence since their priors differ. In fact, it can lead to paradoxical situations where 
credences cross over (Lang, 2014). Meta-methods like Re-Cal won’t work because the 
situation is symmetric (Roush, 2009). The parties can merely decide to split the difference, 
but now they are assuming that both have made errors rather than only one, and that those 
errors are precisely canceling—a highly unlikely set of events, for which there is no evidence. 
If that were a rational requirement, then rationality would be anti-truth-conducive. In short, 
the agents are stuck in a situation of epistemic inconsistency without any generable and 
reliable means of escape. 
 The other Double Agent Dutch Book cases Christensen (1991) discusses are 
relevantly similar. He portrays himself as holding a trusted meta-role when he explains his 
wife’s differing meteorological credences by her “pessimism,” but unless she accepts him as 
a checker and corrector of her views rather than an epistemic peer, she has no reason to 
concede to that judgment. If she fails to concede to his judgment and holds fast to her 
                                                 
10 As Driscoll et al. (2004) make clear for the silicon case, this should not be taken for granted 
as it often is. If a hardware error can make a person calculating a total read a line incorrectly 
while doing the sum, could not the same or similar error make a person read the line 
incorrectly while reporting the results of her calculation? 
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credences, then a clever bookie can do guaranteed damage to their joint bank account.  A 
narrator who accepts Christensen’s view that she is unduly pessimistic will interpret her 
pessimism as an arbitrary hardware failure, where she fails to match her credences to the 
objective chances in accord with Lewis (1980)’s Principal Principle. Since there is a Dutch 
Strategy available in favor of the Principal Principle (Howson, 1992), this serves to identify 
the agent experiencing the Byzantine Fault to third parties. What it does not do, given the 
unavailability of both a checker actually trusted by both parties and additional peer parties, is 
prevent the Byzantine Fault from leading to a Byzantine Failure where the parties exhibit 
interactive inconsistency. 
 Peers exhibit unresolvable epistemic inconsistency (vulnerability to a Double Agent 
Dutch Book) just in case they exhibit interactive inconsistency (Byzantine Failure). When 
agents exhibit interactive inconsistency, they have no reliable strategy available for achieving 
consensus, so they will be subject to Double Agent Dutch Books. When agents exhibit 
unresolvable epistemic inconsistency, they face guaranteed losses through Double Agent 
Dutch Books which both parties would wish to avoid if they had some reliable strategy 
available for achieving consensus. 
2.3 Dutch Strategy Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures 
 As Christensen (1991) suggested, there is nothing fundamentally different about 
single-agent diachronic cases. Any Double Agent Dutch Book can be converted into a Dutch 
Strategy by merely transferring the properties of the second agent to the first agent at a later 
time. If we expect time consistency from rational agents then this is a problem, otherwise not.  
 The same goes for the Byzantine Failure analysis of such cases. If I sum my own 
restaurant bill twice and get two different answers, I have an interactive inconsistency 
because the result should be the same and I have no more tools to resolve the failure than in 
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the two-agent synchronic case. The agent who knows he will be unwarrantedly pessimistic in 
the future can only avoid treating the future self as a peer if the future self can be convinced 
that he is unduly pessimistic—but if the future self is aware of his pessimism and able to act 
on that knowledge then he can update using Roush’s Re-Cal to escape the problem. If the 
future self is unconvinced of his own irrationality, then I am stuck treating him as a peer. If I 
assume that neither of us has experienced a Byzantine Fault, then he must have evidence that 
I lack and have updated his credences by Conditionalizing, so I should use Reflection to 
incorporate that information. If I assume that he has experienced a Byzantine Fault then I 
don’t have a long enough time series (treating each temporal snapshot as a peer processor) to 
avoid Byzantine Failure. If I know that my undue pessimism will wear off, after all, then I 
can use Reflection to update directly to that post-pessimism correct value and there is no 
paradox. 
 Christensen (1991)’s catalog of psychological failures all amount to arbitrary 
hardware faults. In each case, the agent comes to believe something for some reason other 
than updating on evidence by Conditionalization, which is the rational algorithm that (as 
shown by Dutch Strategy) prevents diachronic epistemic inconsistency. In each case, the 
agent is unable to detect and correct his non-rational update. In each case, the resultant 
credence is essentially an arbitrary value. While less obvious, this is even true for Talbott 
(1991)’s forgetting case. When I forget what I had for breakfast, I have to update my 
credence, and I do not do so by Conditionalization on new evidence. What of Talbott’s 
ought-implies-can argument? In order to have a high credence in my choice of breakfast I 
need not remember the gestalt of consuming the breakfast—I need only store the credence 
from when I did remember the gestalt and refuse to update except by Conditionalization on 
new evidence. Characteristic 1.2.2 stated that ideal rational agents have a complete set of 
probabilistic beliefs—otherwise they might have no fair betting quotients for bookies to 
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discover, be unwilling to take bets, and hence lack susceptibility to Dutch Books and 
Strategies not through rational success but rather through inadequacy. The agent with the 
fewest beliefs would be the most rational. If I have a complete set of probabilistic beliefs, 
however, then I must have adequate memory to store those, and cannot lose credences by 
memory pressure. If I lose credences and have to regenerate them from nearby credences 
(about e.g. what I usually have for breakfast), then I have experienced an arbitrary hardware 
failure. Surely Talbott is correct that this does not describe the human situation, in which 
such failures are inevitable, but it fails to do so in a way that is not unique to Dutch 
Strategies. In the other direction, we should expect arbitrary hardware faults to lead to 
vulnerability to Dutch Strategies. Memory faults do so, as Talbott showed. Computation 
faults would lead to incorrect Conditionalization—the only allowed update operation—which 
also results in a Dutch Strategy. 
 Christensen is therefore correct that not much separates Double Agent Dutch Book 
cases and Dutch Strategy cases. Not only are both subject to equivalent betting losses 
(assuming that consistency is demanded in the Double Agent case by e.g. entangled 
finances), but both are generated by Byzantine Faults. Both can be avoided by the same 
degree of enhanced redundancy. 
2.4 Dutch Books as Byzantine Failures 
 Whereas Christensen draws a close analogy between Double Agent Dutch Books and 
Dutch Strategies, he distinguishes both sharply from true Dutch Books (1991, 2000, 2007a). 
The latter he considers as genuine constraints on the credences of ideal rational agents. But 
what kind of irrationality is indicated by susceptibility to a Dutch Book? Brian Weatherson 
(2005) indicates that susceptibility to mathematical error is a sufficient kind of irrationality to 
make an agent vulnerable to Dutch Books. Prospects, after all, are probability distributions 
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over payoffs. If you do the math wrong, you can easily find yourself in a Dutch Book.11 And 
why might you do the math wrong? Well, you experienced an input, memory, or calculation 
error that you didn’t detect and correct: a Byzantine Fault. And as in the two-agent 
synchronic case, in the single-agent synchronic case every Byzantine Fault is trivially a 
Byzantine Failure. There is no justification for imputing some stronger form of irrationality to 
agents vulnerable to Dutch Books when math errors are both common and sufficient for such 
vulnerability.  Conversely, every Byzantine Failure will lead to a Dutch Book. If the 
hardware failure isn’t in credences—the arena subjected to a consistency demand by Dutch 
Books—then it isn’t Byzantine. If the failure is in credences, then an arbitrary change to the 
credence for p, which leaves credences for q, p & q, etc. unaffected, will lead to a Dutch 
Book. Even explicit Dutch Books, of the type demanded by Talbott (1991), can be accepted 
in the event of Byzantine Failures: the fault need only erase the memory of the bookie 
presenting the guaranteed loss before accepting the series of bets. 
 Peer disagreement cases and Dutch Strategy paradoxes both presume Byzantine 
Failures. Unless there is an arbitrary value fault, there is no explanation for why the peers 
disagree or why the supposedly rational agent updates her credences other than by 
Conditionalization on new evidence. In the presence of Byzantine Failures, however, agents 
cannot guarantee that they will avoid Dutch Books. Agents can only satisfy ideal rationality if 
they can avoid Byzantine Failures—if, in Susan Vineberg (1997)’s phrasing, the universe 
declines to conspire against them. 
                                                 
11 Weatherson (2004) argues that since Dutch Books only bind when consistency is expected, 
they do not mandate assigning a credence of 1 to all logical truths. Therefore there’s no 
reason to assume that agents merely have credences rather than calculating them—certainly if 




 Perhaps Christensen could respond that true Dutch Books test for epistemic 
consistency of states, rather than consistency of agents. Maybe the Dutch Book can only be 
offered while the putatively rational agent is in a constant state with respect to all her 
credences. Now, however, there can be no talk of bookies eliciting fair betting quotients—
they must have direct access to the credences of the agent, and they must perform all the 
calculations with respect to the agent’s preference ordering. The trouble with this approach is 
that states don’t have preferences—agents do. Even more clearly, states do not experience 
payoffs. There is a reason that ideal rationality is an attribute of agents, rather than states. 
3. Conclusion: A Stricter Model of Ideal Rationality 
 The conclusion is that, if ideal rationality is to mean anything at all, agents 
experiencing Byzantine Failures cannot count as ideally rational. In the absence of paradoxes 
generated by such failures, however, we have no reason to reject Dutch Strategy-motivated 
constraints on rationality. Such Dutch Strategies then provide a path to a stricter model of 
ideal rationality than that envisioned by Christensen and summarized in characteristics 1.1.1-
1.2.3 at the start of this paper. The first characteristic which can be added is David Lewis’s 
Principal Principle, supported by a Dutch Strategy given by Colin Howson (1992). Then, 
since the Principal Principle is incompatible with contingent priors (Milne, 1991), another 
additional characteristic of ideally rational agents is that their priors will be necessary. 
Necessary a posteriori truths are discovered by evidence, so their priors would be necessary a 
priori. The most promising scheme for necessary a priori priors is Indifference (Pettigrew, 
2016), which assigns the same priors to all agents. Since ideally rational agents’ credences 
are only functions of priors and evidence (Teller, 1973; Armendt, 1980), in the absence of 
Byzantine Failures inconsistencies among agents would all be due to different evidence. Then 
Conditionalization and Reflection have no trouble meeting Christensen (2000)’s demand for 
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impartiality, and no Double Agent Dutch Books are possible against such strictly rational 
agents. 
 This is an extremely strict model for ideal rationality. Philosophers who want to take 
ideal rationality as normative for humans may naturally rebel at such a model.12 But humans 
are subject to Byzantine Faults. A model of bounded rationality intended to be normative for 
humans must show how those faults can be prevented from developing into Byzantine 
Failures. This will inevitably mean deciding that in certain situations insufficient parallelism 
is available for any claim to consistency. In other words, there will be situations in which 
agents with such bounded rationality will not bet. It is irrational to visit a bookie with your 
partner if you think you have opposing beliefs and a joint checking account, and it is just as 
irrational to bet when you suspect that you are experiencing a psychological difficulty that 
impedes your rationality. Nor should we have expected human-like agents to accept bets at 
some fair betting quotient on all propositions, since human-like agents obviously lack the 
complete set of probabilistic beliefs necessary to have such quotients. The characteristics of 
ideal rational agents are closely intertwined, and rejecting some of those characteristics on the 
strength of arbitrary value faults without considering what the possibility of such faults says 
about the system as a whole only leads to confusion. 
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